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I.

INTRODUCTION

[1]
The past two decades have witnessed breathtaking increases in
computing power, as well as equally impressive strides in manufacturing
Powerful, cheap, and
efficiency and technological innovation. 1
interconnected, modern personal computers, smart phones, and e-readers
are rapidly sculpting a landscape of ubiquitous computing. 2 From
shopping online to streaming movies, from social networking to online
dating, and from paying bills to reading digitized books, the average
American now expects the convenient digitization of historically analogue
∗
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1

See generally Mark Weiser, Hot Topics: Ubiquitous Computing, IEEE COMPUTER 71
(1993), available at http://www.cc.ga tech.edu/~keith/classes/ubicomplexity/pdfs/fo
undations/weiser-hot-topics.pdf.
2

Ubiquitous computing is a model of human-computer interaction in which monolithic
desktops are replaced by a variety of small, integrating computing devices that integrate
computer functionality with aspects of daily life. See id. at 71.
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practices and media. In the workplace, this trend has expressed itself
through a strong push toward paperless practices. 3 In the music and
movie industries, this trend has heralded the increasing abandonment of
physical tapes, CDs, and DVDs in favor of instant and on-demand services
such as iTunes and Netflix.4 In the market for books and print media, this
trend has evinced itself in the explosive popularity of e-readers and digital
books. 5
[2]
The digital book infrastructure has proven particularly interesting,
developing rapidly. While the digital makeover provides new and exciting
possibilities for readers, at the same time it creates a headache for the legal
world. 6 Books historically have been defined as sets “of written, printed,

3

See id.

4

See Jonathan C. Tobin, Licensing as a Means of Providing Affordability and
Accessibility in Digital Markets: Alternatives to a Digital First Sale Doctrine, 93 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 167, 180-81 (2011).
5

See id. at 171.

6

New technologies were not always welcomed with open arms, but were usually painted
as the enemies. The first clear example of this was Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Sony introduced the VTR, which offered consumers the
capability to videotape a television show for later viewing, which concerned movie
studios for two reasons: (1) they believed this “time-shifting” capability violated their
copyright protection; and (2) the studios wanted to sell their own line of videodisc players
that did not contain the “time-shifting” capability. See id. at 420-21, 442; see also
Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 798-99 (2010) (stating that
in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that home time-shift recordings were a
permissible fair use). At the time, what the movie studios did not foresee was how
important the VCR was to their survival. By 1999, 88.6 percent of all U.S. households
owned a VCR, Nielsen Study Shows DVD Players Surpass VCRs, PR NEWSWIRE,
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/nielsen-study-shows-dvd-players-surpassvcrs-57201447 .html (last visited Dec. 18, 2011), and rental and sale of videos became
the “largest source of revenue for the [U.S.] movie industry.” Edward Lee, The Ethics of
Innovation: p2p Software Developers and Designing Substantial Noninfringing Uses
Under the Sony Doctrine, 62 J. BUS. ETHICS 147, 148 (2005).
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or blank sheets bound together into a volume,” 7 and while theoretically the
value of the book is not the cost of the paper, but the content of the
words, 8 that maxim has never before been tested in any rigorous sense.
The e-book model marks a sea of changes for print media, as the content
of an e-book exists separately from any physical form. 9 Free from the
tangibility-constraints that both benefited and hindered paper books, ebooks strain copyright laws’ ability to accommodate this new media and
the conventions it entails. 10 Similar to many advances in technology that
decrease the costs of reproduction and distribution of intangible works, the
development of e-books require a reassessment of the proper legal
protection for creators.
[3]
Recent developments in copyright law only complicate emerging
issues in the digital book model. 11 Steady increases in the length of
copyright protection in the United States, as well as the erosion of barriers
to obtaining copyrights, have greatly expanded the set of creative works
protected by legal restrictions on appropriation and distribution.12 At the
same time, elimination of formal recordation and notice requirements and
7

Book, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/book (last
visited Mar. 21, 2011).
8

See Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, E-book Readers Face Sticker Shock, WSJ (Dec. 15, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com /article/SB10001424052970204336104577096762173802678.html
(describing how consumers are willing to pay more than $12.99 for a digital book).
9

Id.

10

See infra Section II.

11

See supra text accompanying note 6; sources cited infra note 12.

12

These changes occurred primarily under the Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-307, 106 Stat. 264 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-512 (1992)) and
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-512 (1988)). For any work published
after 2002, the term of the copyright is the life of the author plus 70 years, and for
corporate authors, 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation (whichever
expires first). 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).
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the extension of copyright terms have resulted in considerable public
confusion over the ownership of many copyrighted materials. 13 Through
passage of time, unrealized protection, or disinterest, many owners of
copyrights have failed to maintain an accessible link to their protected
works. 14 The existence of absentee owners falls particularly hard on users
who would appropriate a copyrighted work for their own use, but who
cannot negotiate a license due to the prohibitive costs of trying to locate
and contact owners that have abandoned their works, but not their
copyright protection. 15 This class of protected works with absentee
owners is now so prevalent that it commands its own title: “orphan
works.” 16
[4]
The current copyright regime significantly hinders the social value
and creative impact of orphan works. Copyright protection, unabated by
an author’s abandonment, hangs as a veritable Sword of Damocles over
would-be appropriators, foreclosing many valuable uses and derivations of
orphan works. 17 This limitation has particularly hindered enterprises
engaged in the digitization of analogue media. 18 By far the most widely
known example of the difficulties of orphaned works for innovators in
digitization is the plight of Google Book Search (“GBS”). 19

13

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER
COPYRIGHTS 15-16 (2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphanreport.pdf.
OF

14

See id. at 28.

15

See generally id. at 15.

16

Id. at 1.

17

Id. at 15-16.

18

See, e.g., Bernard Lang, Orphan Works and the Google Book Search Settlement: An
International Perspective, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 111, 113 (2010).
19

Id.

4
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[5]
In 2004, Google undertook the ambitious and risky project of
scanning millions of books, including orphan works, to be made available
online. 20 Recognizing the increasing demand for instant access to
information in a digital format, Google partnered “with more than forty
major research libraries and thirty thousand publishers.” 21 Google has
already scanned and digitized the contents of more than twelve million
books, 22 pushing the limits, or the lack thereof, of copyright law on the
digitization of orphan works.
[6]
In 2005, the Authors Guild—on behalf of a class of all U.S.
copyright holders—as well as the Association of American Publishers,
filed lawsuits against GBS for copyright infringement. 23 The parties
reached an agreement in the form of an Amended Settlement Agreement
(“ASA”), 24 which the Southern District Court of New York preliminarily
approved on November 19, 2009. 25 The provisions of the ASA not only
proposed a settlement between the parties for any past infringement, but
also proposed a forward-looking business arrangement between the
plaintiff class and GBS that provided GBS a license to scan all out-of-print
books published before May 5, 2009. 26 Importantly, this license conferred
permission from copyright holders to digitize books in exchange for a
profit-sharing structure. 27 The ASA would have made it possible to scan
20

See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Lang,
supra note 18.
21

Pamela Samuelson, Google Book Search and the Future of Books in Cyberspace, 94
MINN. L. REV. 1308, 1308 (2010).
22

Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 670.

23

Id.

24

Id. at 671.

25

Id.

26

See id. at 671-72.

27

See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d. at 671-72.
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all out-of-print books protected by U.S. copyright law by defining the
class plaintiff as including “all persons (and their heirs, successors, and
assigns) who, as of January 5, 2009, own a U.S. copyright interest in one
or more Books or Inserts implicated by a use authorized by the ASA.”28
The court rejected the ASA on March 22, 2011. 29
[7]
In rejecting the ASA, the court admitted the benefits of GBS’s
creation and maintenance of a digital library, but asserted the ASA would
“simply go too far.” 30 The court stated that the “licensing” portion of the
ASA, as it is applied to orphan works, would “result in the involuntary
transfer of copyrights . . . as copyrighted works would be licensed without
the owners’ consent.” 31 The court also asserted that the authority to
change copyright law properly lies with Congress, not the judiciary. 32
[8]
If the ASA does not provide the appropriate solution for the orphan
works problem, then what solution exists? In light of the current
predicament, this article proposes a hybrid solution, combining features of
the ASA, former orphan works legislation, and other areas of copyright
law that would create a comprehensive solution to the orphan work
problem. This hybrid solution includes a legislative amendment that has
the following components: (1) reasonably diligent search of copyright
owner; (2) attribution to orphan works in any later use; (3) an orphan
works registry; (4) a compulsory license fee that would be deposited in an
escrow account; and (5) a non-legislative component in the form of a
private licensing body that copyright owners can participate in for the
purposes of granting collective licenses to third-parties to digitize their
works.
28

Id. at 671.

29

Id. at 686.

30

Id. at 669.

31

Id. at 673.

32

See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 673.
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[9]
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section II
briefly discusses the underlying principles of copyright protection and the
orphan works problem. Section III outlines an axiomatic approach to
assessing and comparing proposed solutions. Within the axiomatic
framework, Section IV discusses and compares a legislative solution, a
market-based solution, and the proposed hybrid solution to the orphan
works problem. Finally, Section V concludes the aforementioned
proposals.
II.

THE PROBLEM OF COPYRIGHT LAW ON ORPHAN WORKS
A.

The Principle of Copyright Protection

[10] While a rigorous substantive and doctrinal analysis of copyright
protection lies beyond the scope of this article, critical analysis of the
orphan works problem requires a minimum level of agreement on the
objectives copyright law should serve. Without speaking to the merits of
any competing motivations for copyright protection, this article focuses on
the commonly held belief that copyright law remedies the failure of
markets to incentivize sufficiently the production of non-tangible creative
works. 33
[11] Models of this market failure have commanded considerable
attention in the law and economics literature. 34 Though a useful exercise,
formal economic models belie the simple intuition behind the market
failure. That intuition is this: while the creation of many intangible works

33

See Einer Elhauge, Why the Google Books Settlement Is Procreative, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1, 23 (2010) (discussing the twin purposes of copyright law: “to reward
authors and maximize the creative works actually made available to the public”).
34

See id.; see also Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW & ECONOMICS 126-138 (3d ed.
2000), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1056&co
ntext=robert_cooter. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 37 (2003).

7
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costs the author considerable resources, reproduction of an intangible
work is often approximately costless in the modern world. 35
[12] As a concrete example, suppose A invests $100 in the creation of a
novel. Once A brings the novel to market, B acquires a copy of it, and
recognizing it will sell well, types it up on her own computer, prints it out
at next-to-no cost to herself, and begins to compete with A in selling A’s
own novel in the open market. Of course B is not the only clever freerider standing around: C, D, and E soon realize the potential profits and
begin mass-producing A’s novel at next to no cost to themselves. The
intuitive result is that A’s novel receives wide distribution to nearly the
entire population, but the intense competition to sell the novel has pushed
the price down to the marginal cost of production, approximately $0. So
A walks away from the experience having spent $100 creating the book,
having recouped almost no revenue from the popularity of her novel, and
having learned a costly lesson not to bother authoring anything else in the
future.
[13] It is important to note that the result of the above story is statically
ideal. No person’s consumption of a copy of A’s book precludes anyone
else from consuming it, and every person who values the book at any
positive level can afford it. Put another way, with respect to a nontangible creative work already in existence, the resource allocation
affected by unconstrained (i.e. zero price) consumption of the work is
welfare maximizing.
[14] The problem with the result of the above story is dynamic. In the
story, A learned not to author any books in the future. Generalized across
the population, A’s experience would suggest low market incentives for
authors to produce non-tangible creative works. 36 With low incentives to
produce non-tangible creative works, one should intuitively expect few
35

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN DIGITAL MEDIA 21-22 (2004),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5738/08-09-Copyright.pdf.
36

Id. at 22.
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such works. Put another way, the production of such a creative work
involves a large positive externality: the population as a whole benefits
greatly from the production of the work, but the author does not
internalize much of this benefit, and therefore finds insufficient motivation
to produce such works in the first place. 37
[15] While numerous solutions to this market failure exist, the historic
approach in this country has afforded the authors of non-tangible creative
works the copyright protection of a limited monopoly on the copying and
distribution of a work. 38 By exploiting monopoly power over distribution
of the work, authors can sell the work at higher than competitive price (i.e.
the very low cost of reproducing or distributing the work), and thus reap
monopoly profits from production. 39 Note that the copyright system
attempts to remedy the dynamic problem of the large positive externality
in authorship at the expense of the static efficiency of widespread
consumption. 40 The potential to earn monopoly profits provides authors
with the incentive to produce more non-tangible creative works, but at the
higher-than-competitive monopoly prices, not all potential consumers can
afford such works, leaving unrealized welfare gains on the table. 41
B.

The Copyright Orphanage

[16] It is a curious irony that the extension of copyright protection has
led to the widespread orphanage of creative works. Since legislation has
extended copyright terms and restrictions on obtaining copyrights have
virtually disappeared, more and more owners have abandoned their works
37

Id.

38

See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (granting exclusive rights to the copyright owner).

39

See COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN DIGITAL MEDIA, supra note 35, at 22.

40

See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49
VAND. L. REV. 483, 552-53 (1996).
41

See COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN DIGITAL MEDIA, supra note 35, at 22.
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without ever releasing the works from copyright protection. 42 This is a
matter of considerable social importance: the monopoly rights of absentee
copyright owners forecloses the social value of having orphan works
adopted, adapted, and made generally accessible. 43
[17] Orphan works account for a significant subset of print media. 44
The “commercial life of most books is relatively short (i.e., they generally
remain ‘in print’ for fewer than five years) . . . .” 45 It has been estimated
that “[o]f the estimated 40 [million] different books held by [U.S.]
libraries, well over half are unlikely ever to find their way back into a
publisher’s favour [sic].” 46 Under the traditional market for books, this is
the end-of-life for these creations, with only the lucky few preserved in
libraries or private collections. 47 Once the books are out-of-print, it is
often difficult to track down the copyright holder because of the length of
the current copyright terms and the lack of formalities to obtain

42

See Marybeth Peters, The Importance of Orphan Works Legislation, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFF. (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/.
43

See REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra
note 13, at 15-16.
44

See generally Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Can Our Culture Be Saved? The Future of
Digital Archiving, 91 MINN. L. REV. 989, 1025 (2007) (“Although no firm figures are
available, the estimate of the number of orphan works . . . is large enough that the
Copyright Office has recommended changes in copyright law that would free them for
use.”).
45

Pamela Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement as Copyright Reform, 2011 WIS. L.
REV. 479, 496 (2011).
46

Richard Waters, Books: A Plan to Scan, FT.COM (Aug. 12, 2009),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d9c722a6-877e-11de-928000144feabdc0.html#axzz1I8bry4
k1.
47

Id.
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copyrights. 48 Approximately 2.5 to 5 million books out of the 40 million
books in U.S. libraries are currently orphans. 49
[18] Orphan works do not lose their intrinsic value over time. 50 Rather,
because copyright holders cannot be located in order to gain permission to
use the works in derivative works, 51 or to transform the works into a new
medium, the continuing value of the works depends upon the orphan
works becoming a part of the public domain at the end of the copyright
term, or finding the copyright holder. 52 Orphan works, and the lack of any
serious solution for dealing with the uncertainty of their copyright
protection, represent an often-prohibitive cost for the creation of new
works deriving from or containing orphan works. 53 Orphan works thus
48

See generally Olive Huang, U.S. Copyright Office Orphan Works Inquiry: Finding
Homes for the Orphans, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265, 267-68 (2006) (discussing the
concerns copyrighted works such as books that have no statutory provisions create).

49

Waters, supra note 46.

50

See Dennis S. Karjala, Eldred v. Ashcroft: Intellectual Property, Congressional Power,
and the Constitution: Judicial Review of Copyright Term Extension Legislation, 36 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 199, 218 (2002) (explaining that many orphan works have “cultural and
social value, but . . . little economic value”).
51

A derivative work is one that is created from a previously copyrighted work, and in
order to claim copyright in the new portion of the work, the work that the new work is
derived from must have been derived from a legitimate use of the previous work. See 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
52

Of course, third parties are always free to copy, distribute, make derivative works and
digitize the work without prior permission. The third party then bears the risk of possible
monetary and injunctive relief that the copyright holder might seek. In the U.S., the
copyright holder is entitled to the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional
profits of the infringer, or statutory damages of between $200-$150,000 per work, if the
work: 1) was published at the time of infringement; and 2) was registered prior to
infringement (unless the registration was made within three months after first
publication). 17 U.S.C. § 504(a), (c) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).
53

See Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in
Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 32 (2011) (“[I]t is unreasonable to
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counteract the purpose of the Copyright and Patent Clause, which is to
advance public welfare. 54
[19] Digitization of orphan works improves public welfare by making
new expressions of content available. 55 The digitization of these books
can breathe new life into a stale work by increasing access and properly
aligning incentive structures with the length of the current copyright
term. 56 Copyright holders of out-of-print books now have the choice, no
matter the date of original publication, to “re-commercialize” their work
for their own benefit, and thus incentivize new creations. 57 But, while
digitization of books is aligned with the economic philosophy of the
Copyright and Patent Clause in the United States Constitution, the
digitization process, as demonstrated in the GBS example, is legally
hindered by the current lack of solution to the orphan works problem. 58
Put simply, permission to scan books cannot be obtained if the copyright
holders cannot be found. 59
prevent creation of a derivative work merely because there is always the possibility that
in the future someone may be able to prove ownership of the underlying orphan work.”).
54

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

55

See Press Release, Cornell University Library, Univs. Band Together to Join Orphan
Works Project (Aug. 24, 2011), available at http://news.library.cornell.edu/news/11082
4/orphanworks.
56

Id.

57

See Keith Porcaro, Private Ordering and Orphan Works: Our Least Worst Hope, 2010
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 15, para. 19 (2010) (“In some cases, digitization will no doubt
reignite interest in a forgotten work, perhaps enough to warrant a reprinting. This new
opportunity for revenue with little additional cost on the part of the creator will in theory
incentivize copyright holders of orphan works to come forward.”).
58

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Amanda N. Wilson, Comment, Jet-Setting Orphan
Works: The Transnational Making Available of Works of Unknown Authorship,
Anonymous Works, or Lost Authors, 23 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 783, 785 n.15 (2009).
59

See Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement, supra note 45, at 493-94.
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[20] The newly available revenue stream introduced by the digitization
of books is significant. 60 Available copyright holders get to enjoy this
opportunity cost, as innovators will come to them and bargain for a license
to digitize. 61 Absentee copyright holders, however, cannot enjoy the value
of this opportunity cost, either: (1) because they are unavailable to bargain
for a new license; or (2) because fear that the legal punishment might
exceed potential profits precludes potential licensees from going ahead
with digitization.
[21] Orphan works pose a significant hindrance to the creation of
derivative works and the digitization of orphan works. The orphan works
problem breaks down the incentive structure of the copyright system for
the absentee owners, as they cannot fully exploit their works due to the
inability of third parties to bargain for licenses. 62 As the traditional
publication business model evolves into a digital one, and as current
orphan books go into the public domain (if the copyright term is not
extended yet again), this problem will eventually correct itself.
Digitization means that books in current protection will remain widely
available as long as sales continue to generate royalties, and, in this state
of affairs, copyright holders are more likely to keep their contact
information updated resulting in the abandonment of fewer works.
Nevertheless, these incentives cannot work their magic on orphan works.
Stuck in a catch-22 of incentive incompatibility, orphan works grow
musty on shelves instead of circulating anew online. Unless authors
intend to abandon such works, a legal solution is needed to correct the
current problem.

60

See Porcaro, supra note 57 (discussing the revenue regime constructed by Google for
the digitization of books under the Google Book Search).
61

See REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, supra
note 13, at 93.
62

Id. at 15.

13
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AN AXIOMATIC APPROACH TO ASSESSING SOLUTIONS

[22] Comparing different policies of copyright protection requires a
clarification of the objectives sought in a policy change. In terms of ideal
objectives, the law and economics literature has suggested many welfaremaximization models of copyright protection. 63 At various levels of
sophistication, these models generally boil down to an unsurprising
recommendation: social efficiency results from balancing the dynamic
benefit incentivizing authorship against the static inefficiency of
constraining the availability of works once produced. 64 A practical
problem with the formal welfare-maximization approach is that moving
from abstract generalities to concrete recommendations requires the
imposition of strong and often untenable modeling assumptions; therefore,
precision is bought ultimately at the expense of credibility. 65
[23] As an alternative to reliance on strong assumptions about
important unknowns in social welfare, this article pursues a lowassumption, axiomatic approach in assessing the desirability of various
solutions to the orphan work problem. Rather than trying to say what
policy would prove universally optimal, this approach asks the question
more narrowly: what policy would obviously improve upon the current
one? Put another way, this article seeks a policy for disposing of the
orphan work problem that is a Pareto Optimality upon the current policy

63

See generally LANDES & POSNER, supra note 34, at 37, 71, 85, 210 (discussing various
models of copyright protection).
64

See Sami Valkonen & Lawrence J. White, An Economic Model for the Incentive/Access
Paradigm of Copyright Propertization: An Argument in Support of the Proposed New
§514 to the Copyright Act 50-51 (NYU Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 06-15,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=895554.
65

Charles Manski has termed this type of problem the “Law of Decreasing Marginal
Credibility.” In brief, the law states that stronger assumptions yield sharper, but less
credible predictions. CHARLES F. MANSKI, IDENTIFICATION FOR PREDICTION AND
DECISION 2-3 (2007).
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regime. 66 In terms of the orphan work problem, the requirements of a
Pareto improving policy are easily expressed as two intuitive axioms that
any adequate solution must satisfy. Axiom 1: The absentee owners of
orphaned works must not be made worse off as a result of the policy
solution. 67 Axiom 2: The accessibility of non-tangible creative works
must be marginally increased as a result of the policy solution. These
axioms define a class of policy solutions that are preferable to the current
situation. As noted in the following application of the axiomatic approach
to various proposed solutions, many properties of an adequate solution to
the orphaned work problem can be observed, even in the absence of strong
modeling assumptions.
IV.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO ORPHAN WORK PROBLEM
A.

Legislative Approach

1.

Proposed Legislation

[24] After extensive review of the issues implicated by orphan works,
the United States Copyright Office (“Copyright Office”) prepared a report
on orphan works that proposed a legislative solution to the problem. 68
66

A Pareto Optimality is defined as a resource reallocation that makes at least one party
strictly better off and no party worse off. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 712 (9th ed. 2009).
67

See The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), LIBRARY
ECONOMICS AND LIBERTY, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/bios/Pareto.html (last
visited Jan. 16, 2012). For sake of brevity, the following analysis considers the value of a
copyright to be economic profit attainable from possession of a limited copyright over
distribution of the copyrighted work. It is worth noting that possession of a copyright
might be valuable to creators for other reasons: e.g. the pride that comes from “owning”
one’s creation or an artist’s “right” to control how a work is adopted and adapted. See
Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property,
16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 81, 163-64 (1998).
OF

68

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 5.
However, the proposed legislation died in the House of Representatives. David Kravets,
‘Orphan Works’ Copyright Law Dies Quiet Death, WIRED, Sept. 30, 2008,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/09/orphan-works-co/.
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The proposed legislative solution would allow a user to appropriate an
orphan work only if the user first performed “a reasonably diligent search
for the copyright owner but is unable to locate that owner . . . .” 69 The
standard of a reasonably diligent search is essentially an “ad hoc”
determination, 70 and the reasonably diligent search does not shield the
user from liability from payment of reasonable monetary compensation to
the absentee owner if he later appears. 71
[25] The proposed orphan works legislation provides absentee owners
the ability to recover damages and seek injunctive relief for the
appropriation of their work without prior permission, but limits remedies
on account of the owners’ inability to affirmatively grant or deny
permission. 72 Absentee owners may recover monetary damages for only
commercial uses, and, even then, only reasonable compensation
representing “the amount the user would have paid to the owner had they
engaged in negotiations before the infringing use commenced.”73
Injunctive relief is available to absentee owners if a user digitizes a work
in its entirety without modification, but not if the user incorporates the
orphan work into “a derivative work that also includes significant
expression of the user . . . .” 74
[26] The Copyright Office rejected two alternative features suggested
by various commentators to the proposed legislation: (1) an escrow
account into which each user must pay prior to engaging in the use of

69

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 8.

70

Id. at 11.

71

See id. at 12-13.

72

See id. at 8.

73

Id. at 12.

74

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 13.
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orphan works; 75 and (2) the creation of a user registry where users register
an intent-to-use an orphan work, a description of the work, and the
certification that the reasonably diligent search was conducted. 76 The
Copyright Office eschewed the inclusion of an escrow account because it
considered the chances of copyright holders coming forward to claim
royalties deposited into the escrow account as low, which suggests escrow
funds would rarely be distributed. 77 Furthermore, the Copyright Office
rejected the proposal for a user registration because it believed such a
registry would prove burdensome for those using numerous orphan works,
and because a textual database would not assist users without some sort of
unique identifier for each work, which would be difficult to administer. 78
The proposed legislation has been pending in Congress since April 2008. 79
2.

Solution Analysis

[27] A sufficient condition for the legislative solution to constitute an
obvious improvement upon the status quo is satisfaction of both axioms
defined in Section III. The legislative approach seems likely to satisfy
Axiom 2, but most likely violates Axiom 1.
[28] Axiom 1 requires that any policy change not make absentee
owners worse off. At first glance, this determination, a formidable
undertaking, is simplified greatly by similarity of the status quo and
legislative solution’s assignment of rights in most situations. In fact, from
75

See id. at 11, 113-14

76

See id. at 112-13.

77

See id. at 11, 113-14.

78

Id. at 114.

79

See S. 2913, 110th Cong. (2008) (as passed by Senate, Sept. 26, 2008); H.R. 5889,
110th Cong. (2008) (as forwarded by Subcomm., May 7, 2008). However, “[b]ecause
this bill was introduced in a previous session of Congress, no more action can occur on
it.” H.R. 5889: Orphan Works Act of 2008, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/cong
ress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-5889 (last visited Nov. 18, 2011).
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the absentee owner’s perspective, the two policy regimes differ only under
a narrow set of facts: (1) the user must have exercised due diligence in
attempting to locate the absentee owner; (2) the user must have failed to
locate the owner; (3) the user must subsequently have appropriated the
owner’s protected work; and (4) the owner must have eventually
discovered the appropriation.
[29] In this narrow situation, current copyright law affords the absentee
owner a valuable set of rights: the owner is entitled to either: (1) legal
relief from copyright infringement, including injunctions, actual damages
and profits, and statutory damages and attorneys’ fees if the copyright was
registered within three months of publication and prior to infringement; 80
or (2) any compensation package and licensing fee privately negotiated in
the shadow of potential legal relief, or indeed the issuance of an
injunction. By contrast, the proposed legislative solution affords the
absentee owner an ostensibly less valuable set of rights: the owner is
entitled to either (1) reasonable monetary compensation, 81 or in the case
“where the use was noncommercial and the user ceases the infringement
expeditiously upon notice,” no compensation; 82 (2) injunctive relief only if
the orphan work was included in a derivative work that has transformed
the work sufficiently as to not limit the absentee owners’ right to exploit
the orphan work (now no longer orphan); 83 or (3) any compensation
package and licensing fee privately negotiated in the shadow of the limited
potential legal relief. 84 It is also possible that, by the time the absentee
owner discovered the appropriation of his copyright, the user himself may
qualify as an absentee owner (especially if copyright terms continue to be
extended).
80

See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504-505 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011).

81

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 11.

82

Id.

83

Id. at 12.

84

See id. at 84, 93.
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[30] As a practical matter, it seems clear that the proposed legislative
solution affords absentee owners a less valuable set of rights than under
the status quo. While this analysis is by no means exhaustive, it illustrates
at least a reasonable concern that absentee owners will be made worse off
as the result of the proposed legislative solution due to the decrease in
possible compensation from infringement and opportunity to exploit their
own work.
[31] Axiom 2 requires that the accessibility of the orphan works be
increased marginally relative to current copyright law. The proposed
legislation easily satisfies Axiom 2. Under the current system, the risk of
appropriating an orphaned work without permission of the absentee owner
is much greater than under the proposed legislation. 85 The marginal
decrease in potential damages suggests that users are marginally more
likely to accept the risk of appropriating orphaned works, thus marginally
increasing the accessibility of such works in derivative (which may not
have been possible without the orphan work) or digitized form.
[32] Based on the above analysis, it seems unlikely that the proposed
legislative solution would constitute a Pareto improvement upon the
current system. The legislative solution benefits potential users of
orphaned works, but does so at the expense of absentee owners. This does
not mean that the proposed orphan works legislation is bad or even
undesirable; nevertheless, it does mean that the legislative solution is not
the obvious improvement over current copyright law sought under the
axiomatic approach.
B.

The GBS Solution – a Market Response
1.

Amended Settlement Agreement

[33] GBS entered into a settlement agreement with the class of
copyright holders represented by the Authors’ Guild and the Association
85

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 15-16.
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of American Publishers for the sake of certainty and efficiency, which was
rejected on March 22, 2011. 86 Despite its ultimate rejection by the
Southern District Court of New York, the ASA model is worth studying as
a potential solution to the orphan works problem.
[34] The ASA attempted to create a market solution to the orphan
works problem. 87 For GBS to succeed Google needed to index as many
books in its collection as possible: if the ASA forced GBS to omit 2.5 to 5
million orphaned books, the success of the project would be impeded
substantially. 88 The ASA sought to remedy the narrow aspect of the
orphan works problem relevant to GBS, namely, Google’s use of orphaned
books in a digitization capacity. 89 The ASA included a settlement contract
between Google and a class of owners defined, after the amendment, as
“all persons . . . who, as of January 5, 2009, own a U.S. copyright interest
in one or more Books or Inserts implicated by a use authorized by the
ASA.” 90 The only option for exclusion from the settling class was for the
86

Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The purpose
of the GBS project was to index the books and make them available either in full (if the
book is in the public domain or if display is authorized), or show a preview of the content
of the book, in snippets, and offer links to stores and libraries where users can locate a
physical copy of the book. See id. at 669-70. GBS’ defense is that indexing and making
available snippets of the in-copyright and out-of-print books is fair use, such that prior
permission is not needed for this adaption of a protected work. Id. at 670-71.
87

See id. at 669. Google was well aware of the orphan works problem before the start of
the GBS project, and is a proponent of the proposed orphan works legislation.
Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement, supra note 45, at 522-23.
88

See Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement, supra note 45, at 525 n.221 (citing
Memorandum from William Morris Endeavor Entertainment (Aug. 2009)), available at
http://thepublicindex.org/docs/commentary/wme.pdf).

89

Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 671; see Samuelson, The Google Book Settlement,
supra note 45, at 495 (citing Letter from David Drummond, Vice President, Corporate
Dev. & Gen. Counsel for Google Inc., to Jule L. Sigall, Assoc. Register for Policy & Int‘l
Affairs for U.S. Copyright Office (Mar. 25, 2005)), available at http://www.
copyright.gov/orphan/ comments/OW0681-Google.pdf).
90

Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 671.
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copyright holders to opt-out affirmatively. 91 This automatically included
absentee copyright holders as, by definition, part of the class. 92
[35] Had the ASA received approval, it would have created a
significant advantage for Google because Google would have received the
right to digitize all orphan books without engaging in reasonable efforts to
locate the absentee copyright holders 93, while enjoying the benefit of
immunity to potential litigation arising from infringement in the future. 94
No other party would have enjoyed the same benefits without duplicating
Google’s efforts. The ASA also provided that Google would fund the
creation of the Book Rights Registry (“BRR”), which would have
allocated the royalties earned by GBS and also tracked down copyright
holders to appropriately distribute royalties through a complicated
algorithm. 95
2.

Solution Analysis

[36] If satisfying both axioms outlined in Section III, the GBS
settlement agreement would constitute a Pareto improvement over the
current system. Based on this analysis, it appears that the ASA would
have satisfied the conditions of both Axiom 1 and Axiom 2.

91

This option to opt-out was exercised by 6800 rights holders. Id. at 673. This was one
of the reasons that Judge Chin rejected the ASA. See id. at 670.
92

See id. at 681.

93

See id. at 669, 673. A Books Right Registry was charged with the task of finding and
locating unknown copyright holders, as well as distribute the license fees paid to it by
Google among its members. See id. at 671-72.
94

Id. at 676.

95

Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 671-72.
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[37] Under Axiom 1, policy changes cannot make absentee owners
worse off and still qualify as a Pareto improvement. 96 In fact, it seems
likely that the absentee owners would have been considerably better off
under the ASA than under the current copyright scheme. The relevant fact
pattern for consideration under this scenario is slightly different than the
fact pattern considered for the proposed orphan works legislation. Under
this fact pattern: (1) GBS locates an out-of-print book and, without inquiry
as to the location of the owner, digitizes the book; (2) Google makes
revenue on the digitized book and shares profit with BRR; (3) BRR cannot
locate the owner; and (4) the absentee owner resurfaces and notices that
Google has digitized her book without permission.
[38] The current copyright system affords an absentee owner the right
to sue Google upon discovery of the digitization, which could result from
any of the following outcomes: (1) Google is assessed a licensing fee
either as the result of a settlement or judgment after litigation; 97 (2)
Google is enjoined from showing or selling snippets of the books; 98 or (3)
Google’s digitization efforts are considered fair use, and no monetary
relief is offered to the absentee owner. 99
[39] Under the ASA, absentee owners within the settling class would
have essentially given Google a compulsory license to digitize any out-ofprint books (published before January 5, 2009) whose copyrights are
owned by the absentee owners. 100 Absentee owners, upon resurfacing,
can collect reasonable compensation from Google for Google’s
digitization of their books; compensation is provided by BRR and based
96

See supra text accompanying note 67.

97

See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006).

98

See 17 U.S.C. § 502.

99

See 17 U.S.C. § 107.

100

See Amended Settlement Agreement § 2.2, Authors Guild, 700 F. Supp. 2d 666 (No.
05 CV 8136-DC) [hereinafter ASA].
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on the sales and advertising revenues earned by Google. 101 The ASA
would provide absentee owners the same monetary relief as the proposed
orphan works legislation, without litigation and without uncertainty from
litigation. 102 Additionally, in the event that absentee owners resurface,
these owners would possess the option to ask Google to remove the book
from the registry, and Google must comply with the request as soon as
reasonably practicable, but no later than thirty days from the date of the
request. 103
[40] The only difference in relief between the current system and the
system proposed by the ASA is the right for the absentee owners to get
statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. 104 Under current laws, additional
monetary relief is available only if the author registers the copyright
within the first three months of publication and before any infringement
occurred. 105 It is unlikely that this requirement would change copyright
owners’ likelihood of recovery because monetary compensation in a
copyright infringement case is based upon a combination of the copyright
owner’s lost revenues and the infringer’s profits. 106 Given that Google
only digitized out-of-print books without permission, it is unlikely that the
absentee owners could prove any lost revenues. Also, Google already
shares its profits with BRR, who provides them to the absentee owners.107
Even in the event that statutory damages and attorneys’ fees were
101

See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).

102

See id.

103

ASA, supra note 100, § 3.5(a)(i).

104

Compare id. § 5.5 (capping attorneys’ fees at $30 million), with 17 U.S.C. § 504
(2006) (providing statutory damages), and 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2006) (providing reasonable,
but uncapped, attorneys’ fees).

105

See 17 U.S.C. § 412.

106

See 17 U.S.C. § 504.

107

See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 671-72.
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available, the absentee owners would need to engage in costly litigation in
order to recover statutory damages and attorneys’ fees. Because absentee
owners are not likely to successfully claim statutory damages and
attorneys’ fees, and because of the high transaction costs and uncertainty
involved in recovery through litigation, the “compulsory license” fee to be
paid by Google to the absentee owners seems likely to confer at least as
great a benefit to absentee owners as provided by the current system. 108
Thus, the absentee owner is made no worse off, and likely placed in a
better position under the current system than under the proposed
legislative solution to the orphan works problem. 109
[41] Under Axiom 2, the accessibility of the orphan works would have
increased significantly under the ASA, 110 even more so than under the
proposed orphan works legislation. Had the court approved the ASA,
Google could have digitized all out-of-print books as long as it paid the
appropriate royalties to BRR. 111 Additionally, because the agreement
constituted a settlement agreement, it would have eliminated future
uncertainty regarding infringement for all books published before January
5, 2009 that Google might scan. 112 The cost-savings and certainty

108

Compare ASA, supra note 100, § 2.1 (giving an overview of the benefits of the ASA
for copyright owners), with 17 U.S.C. § 504 (embodying the current statutory recovery
rights of infringed copyright owners). Google’s digitization of an out-of-print book does
not affect any existing market, and thus there is no lost revenue for the absentee owners.
The money generated by GBS is a newly found revenue stream.
109

Compare ASA, supra note 100, § 2.1 (proposing a streamlined system by which
copyright owners who cannot be easily found are compensated for infringement by
Google), with U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 10, at 8
(suggesting limiting a copyright owner’s recovery in litigation if the infringer performed
a reasonably diligent search for the owner).
110

See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 670.

111

See ASA, supra note 100, § 3.1(a).

112

See Author’s Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 676.
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afforded by the ASA would have allowed Google to scan, digitize, and
make accessible more orphan books than without the agreement. 113
[42] Even if the proposed orphan works legislation could govern
Google’s conduct, the terms of the ASA would still place Google in a
better position. If governed by the proposed legislation, Google would
have to expend efforts to determine whether a book is an orphan work
before proceeding with the digitization of the book. Even then, Google
would not enjoy the certainty provided by the terms of the ASA. If an
absentee owner reappeared, Google would have to pay reasonable
compensation because Google uses the books for commercial purposes,
and, under the proposed orphan works legislation, Google might also be
subject to injunction.114 Finally, the uncertainty of potential litigation
would stand as a considerable disincentive for Google to continue
scanning and digitizing orphan books.
[43] Based on this analysis, the ASA would have been a Pareto
improvement over the current system, and even over the proposed orphan
works legislation, because the absentee owner would be no worse off and
the access to orphan works would significantly increase. Between Google
and absentee owners, the ASA solution would have been an obvious
improvement upon the current copyright system.
C.

Hybrid Solution Proposal

[44] After considering both the legislative and ASA models detailed
above, it appears that a hybrid solution, combining features from the
proposed orphan works legislation, the now rejected ASA, and some other
features of copyright law – such as compulsory licenses – may improve
113

Under the proposed legislation, everybody may digitize or incorporate an orphan work
after a reasonably diligent search for the author of a work. See U. S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 122. Under the ASA, the right to do so is
granted only to Google. See Author’s Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 682-83.
114

See U. S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 13.
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upon certain shortcomings inherent in each of the above solutions
alone. 115 The proposed orphan works legislation creates a more
systematic approach and applies this approach broadly. 116 Unfortunately,
it does so by taking away only part of the offending uncertainty,
decreasing potential recovery for absentee owners, and maintaining the
same transaction costs for recovery. 117 The ASA, on the other hand,
eliminates uncertainty for users, guarantees reasonable recovery for
absentee owners, and significantly reduces transaction costs. 118 However,
the scope of the ASA is limited because it would only apply to books, and
would allow only Google to digitize out-of-print books. 119 This
significantly limits the benefits of the ASA model, and the problem of
digitizing orphan works requires a much broader solution. I suggest that a
hybrid solution is best suited to affect the common goal of the ASA and
legislative solutions: that is, to provide reasonable compensation to
absentee owners – in the event that they reappear – without limiting the
ability of users to appropriate and build upon orphan works in the
meantime.
1.

Components of the Hybrid Solution

[45] The proposed hybrid solution combines features of the proposed
orphan works legislation, the ASA, and current copyright law to improve
upon the status quo. The components in the hybrid solution to the orphan
works problem are as follows:
a. a reasonably
requirement;

diligent

115

See supra Parts IV.A.2 and IV.B.2.

116

See supra Part IV.A.

117

See supra Part IV.A.

118

See Author’s Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 671-72.

119

See id. at 672.
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b. an orphan works registry where users register works
determined to be orphaned after conducting a
reasonably diligent search;
c. an escrow account for the payment of the compulsory
license fee from users to absentee owners; and
d. the creation of a licensing entity for non-absentee
owners 120, similar to ASCAP, BMI and SESAC for
music.
These components, analyzed in detail below, would affect a solution to the
orphan works problem that satisfy both axioms proposed in Section III.
a.

Reasonably Diligent Search and Attribution

[46] A reasonably diligent search requirement is an important
component for any orphan works solution. Without such a requirement,
the misappropriation of non-orphan works is more likely than not. A
reasonably diligent search defines what constitutes an orphan work:
orphan works are works whose copyright owner cannot be determined or
located through a sufficiently detailed search effort. 121 If the owner of the
work is identified, but does not respond to a request for a license, that
work does not qualify as an orphan work, and any appropriation of the
work constitutes copyright infringement. 122 This is consistent with the
commonly accepted principle of copyright protection that copyright
holders have the right to refuse reproduction and distribution of their
work. 123 The terms of a reasonably diligent search will vary depending on
the type of work and the court will determine whether a search is
reasonably diligent on an ad hoc basis. 124 The proposed orphan works
120

This represents the non-legislative component of the hybrid solution.

121

See U. S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 1.

122

See id. at 8-9.

123

Id. at 9.

124

See id. at 95-100.
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legislation includes a requirement for a reasonably diligent search for the
owner of an appropriated work.
[47] Attribution of an appropriated orphan work in a derivative work
confers two important benefits: (1) it may help absentee owners recognize
their work and come forward to claim ownership of it; and (2) it provides
notice of an orphaned work heritage to later users who wish to appropriate
the derivative work. 125
b.

Orphan Works Registry

[48] The orphan works registry would require users to register works
they believe are orphan works. 126 The Copyright Office would manage
the registry. 127 The user would provide the Copyright Office with the
name of the work and the reasonable steps taken to find the owner. This
registry would uniquely identify each orphan work, and subsequent users
would rely on the registry to determine whether a work has been
designated an orphan after a reasonably diligent search. 128 If so qualified,
subsequent users would not need to conduct their own reasonably diligent
search before appropriating or adapting the work. The orphan works
registration would save transaction costs for users, as users of a common
work would not need to engage in redundant search reporting
125

See id. at 110-12.

126

Although the benefit of such a registry for all future copyright creators is important, if
the registry is simply voluntary, it is likely that only a few will choose to register the
orphan works with the registry. Making the registry mandatory will increase registration
of orphan works, and encourage users to start their reasonably diligent search at the
registry, which will help decrease transactional cost incurred because of repeated
searches conducted each time a user wishes to use an orphan work.
127

See CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, DUKE LAW SCHOOL, ORPHAN
WORKS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 10-11 (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.law.duke.
edu/ cspd/proposal.pdf.
128

See id. at 9-10 (for discussion of what qualifies as a “reasonable diligent search”).
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requirements. If the copyright holder believes that there is a mistake, he
would have a record of whom he needs to contact to remedy the situation.
[49] The Copyright Office rejected the proposal for a registry where
users register the orphan works they intend to use for the purpose of
providing a “published” notice to copyright holders, similar to the registry
for a compulsory license for making and distributing phonorecords. 129
The Copyright Office premised its rejection on a belief that such a registry
would place an excessive burden on copyright holders to keep checking
the registry to ensure no one has misappropriated a work. 130 Some groups
opposed such a proposal on the basis that it would “impair their
competitive position with other publishers, who would use the filings to
determine what books or types of books they plan to publish.” 131
[50] The orphan works registry would differ from the proposed users’
or owners’ registries because the right to use the orphan work would not
derive from the registration of orphan works with the registry. 132 Rather,
the registry would serve as a centralized forum for the copyright
community to share information about a particular work and mitigate the
unnecessary transaction costs inherent in redundant reasonably diligent
searches. 133 The registration process should not be so burdensome as to
discourage registration or use, but should provide sufficient detail to
identify an alleged orphan work through registry search. For example, a
copy of the work might be included for proper identification, or summary
and descriptive keywords might be used to limit the search space.
129

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 105.

130

See id. at 76.

131

Id. at 112-13.

132

See generally CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, supra note 127.

133

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 78-79
(discussing the benefits of “piggybacking” or allowing a user to rely on a previous user’s
searches by improving efficiency in searching).
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Compulsory License

[51] A compulsory license is “where the government requires that
copyright owners make their works available to users, usually at a fixed
price.” 134 Canada has instituted a compulsory license as a solution to the
orphan works problem in Canada. 135 There are also several examples of
compulsory licenses used under United States copyright law, including
secondary transmission by cable systems, 136 ephemeral recordings, 137
public performance of sound records by means of a digital audio
transmission, 138 making and distributing phonorecords, 139 certain works in
connection with non-commercial broadcasting, 140 secondary transmission
by satellite carriers, 141 and distribution of digital audio recording devices
and media. 142 A compulsory license is also available as a monetary
damage award in patent infringement cases. 143 The ongoing royalty
payments from Google to BRR in the ASA could have been construed as a
compulsory license agreement between Google and the settling class.

134

S. J. Liebowitz, Alternative Copyright Systems: The Problems with a Compulsory
License (Progress & Freedom Found., D.C.), June 10, 2003, at 3, available at
http://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/intprop/complpff.pdf.
135

Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, § 77 (Can.).

136

17 U.S.C. § 111 (2006).

137

17 U.S.C. § 112.

138

See 17 U.S.C. § 114.

139

17 U.S.C. § 115.

140

17 U.S.C. § 118.

141

17 U.S.C. § 119; 17 U.S.C. § 122.

142

See 17 U.S.C. § 115.

143

Cf. Paice v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F. 3d 1293, 1313 n.13 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(distinguishing between ongoing royalty order and compulsory license).
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[52] In determining the appropriate compulsory license system for
orphan works, this paper reviews two compulsory license systems: (1) that
applying to the making and distribution of phonorecords; and (2) the
patent compulsory license.
i.

Compulsory License for Making and
Distributing Phonorecords

[53] The most well known compulsory license is the compulsory
license for the making and distributing of phonorecords. 144 This provision
allows a third party to distribute a new sound recording of a musical work
if that work has been previously distributed to the public under the
authority of the copyright owner. 145 In exchange, the third party must
provide notice of the intention to obtain a compulsory license, 146 as well
as deposit a royalty payment. 147 This compulsory license system has built
in a protocol for absentee owners, where if the copyright holder is not
known, then the notice and payments are sent to the Licensing Division of
the Copyright Office. 148 The compulsory license prevents monopolistic
behavior related to a particular musical work, while continuing to provide
the incentives to encourage the creation of new musical works by paying
the creators a compulsory license. 149

144

See 17 U.S.C. § 115.

145

See id.

146

37 C.F.R. § 201.18 (2008).

147

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 73: COMPULSORY LICENSE FOR MAKING AND
DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS 2, (2011), available at http://www.copyright.
gov/circs/circ73.pdf.
148

Id. at 3.

149

See id. at 1-2.
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Patent Compulsory License

[54] The concept of compulsory patent licensing dates back to the early
amendments made to the Paris Convention of 1883. 150 Today, the Paris
Convention and its progeny, in conjunction with the WTO’s Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPs”) 151,
authorize compulsory licensing in various situations. 152 Courts often
impose a patent compulsory license after litigation determines that patent
has been infringed. 153

150

See Paul Champ & Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO
TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the U.S.-Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L.
365, 371 n.40 (2002) (“The concept of compulsory licensing was not mentioned in the
1883 Paris Convention . . . [but] was introduced as an amendment in the 1925 Hague
Revision . . . .”); see also Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 5,
Mar. 20, 1883 (amended Sept. 28, 1979), 21 U.S.T. 1583.
151

See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 2, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter TRIPS] (“In respect of Parts II, III, and IV of this
Agreement, Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 12, and Article 19, of the
Paris Convention . . . [and] [n]othing shall derogate from existing obligations that
Members may have to each other [thereunder] . . . .”).
152

See id. at arts. 30-31 (describing compulsory licensing in regulating scenarios
“[w]here the law of a Member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent
without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third
parties authorized by the government . . . .”).
153

Yet, despite its long-term acceptance abroad, federal courts and commentators
traditionally rejected the compulsory license as a proper remedy in patent infringement
disputes, instead favoring an injunction against the patent infringer. See Jaideep
Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of Nonpracticing Patentees After eBAY v.
MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 34 (2009) (explaining that prior to 2006, “[t]he
prevalence of the view that private bargaining of property rights leads to more efficient
outcomes than ‘judicial guesstimates’ of appropriate royalty rates led to judicial and
academic disapproval of compulsory licensing of patents”) (citing In re Mahurkar Double
Lumen Hemodialysis Catheter Patent Litig., 831 F. Supp. 1354, 1396-97 (N.D. Ill.
1993)).
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[55] The right to a patent comes from the same clause in the United
States Constitution as the right to a copyright. 154 Patentees are given a
limited monopoly to exclude others from practicing their inventions
without their permission, and in exchange for this monopoly, patentees
must reveal their inventions to the United States Patent and Trademark
Office for public use after the patent term expires. 155 Patents have a much
shorter lifespan than copyrights, and patentees have to follow recordation
and periodic payment requirements of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office to maintain the life of the patent, so there are typically
no orphaned patents. 156
[56] Although the Patent Act’s filing requirements generally foreclose
the notion of orphaned patents, the most analogous aspect of patent
compulsory licensing is the recent debate regarding the different treatment
of practicing patentees and non-practicing patentees with respect to their
right to legal relief during litigation. 157 The Supreme Court recently
responded to disagreement regarding the appropriateness of injunctive
relief for non-practicing patentees in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
154

See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl.8.

155

See generally Patents, USPTO.GOV, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/index.jsp (last
modified Dec. 22, 2011) (“A patent is an intellectual property right granted by the
Government of the United States of America to an inventor ‘to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or
importing the invention into the United States’ for a limited time in exchange for public
disclosure of the invention when the patent is granted.”).
156

See generally General Information Concerning Patents, USPTO.GOV (Nov. 2011),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/index.jsp (describing maintenance fees to maintain the
patent in force).
157

See Venkatesan, supra note 153, at 28 (“[There] are those who argue that awarding
injunctive relief to . . . nonpracticing patentees and those holding patents of questionable
validity or value[] causes a ‘hold up’ problem in which such patentees can obtain
royalties greater than the true value of their patents. In this view, overcompensating
patentees distorts the incentives to innovate, design, and sell new technologies to the
detriment of the economy and public interest.”).
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L.L.C., 158 unanimously holding that the traditional four-factor test 159
followed by federal courts in considering permanent injunctive relief
should be applied to disputes under the Patent Act. 160 The Court
emphasized broad equitable discretion in applying this standard and
denounced the practice of issuing injunctions automatically once a party
shows infringement. 161 Although the Court limited its holding to general
principles, 162 eBay revitalized compulsory licensing by ensuring that
judges consider modern patent practices and how such circumstances
impact the suitability of injunctive relief. 163
[57] District courts have responded accordingly, denying injunctions to
non-practicing patentees in favor of compulsory licensing orders. 164
158

eBay Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).

159

See id. at 391 (“A plaintiff [seeking injunctive relief] must demonstrate: (1) that it has
suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance
of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4)
that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”).
160

See id. at 391-94.

161

See id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J. concurring) (“From at least the early 19th century, courts
have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of
patent cases. . . . This historical practice, as the Court holds, does not entitle a patentee to
a permanent injunction or justify a general rule that such injunctions should issue.”).
162

See id. at 394.

163

See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (“In cases now arising trial
courts should bear in mind that in many instances the nature of the patent being enforced
and the economic function of the patent holder present considerations quite unlike earlier
cases. . . . The equitable discretion over injunctions, granted by the Patent Act, is well
suited to allow courts to adapt to the rapid technological and legal developments in the
patent system.”).
164

See, e.g., Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1379-81 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(vacating a district court injunction order and ordering a compulsory license); Paice LLC
v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313-15 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (upholding court’s
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Subject to a reasonable royalty determined by the court, a proven infringer
becomes an authorized licensee if royalties are paid to the non-practicing
patentee. 165 The royalties to be paid from infringer to non-practicing
patentee should be reasonable with the limitation to the rate set by the jury
or other licenses by the non-practicing licensee. These royalty rates do not
take into consideration the position of the parties in litigation, and what
type of royalty rates the parties could establish through private bargaining
in light of any pending litigation. 166
iii.

Proposed Orphan Works Compulsory License

[58] This paper proposes that an escrow account, similar to the BRR or
the Licensing Division of the Copyright Office, be set up so that each time
a user incorporates an orphan work in a derivative work, or digitizes an
orphan work, a statutorily prescribed amount is deposited into the account
governed by the Copyright Office. Absentee owners may at a later time
reclaim royalties on their orphaned works. The escrow account would
function similarly to the account that currently receives royalties for
making and distributing phonorecords under Section 115 of the Copyright
Act, 167 except the proposed escrow account would not make payment
unless and until an absentee owner claimed right to the royalty. The
Copyright Office has rejected the creation of such an escrow account
because it believes it unlikely that any absentee owners would come
forward to make a claim for compensation, and because it is logistically
authority to issue an “ongoing royalty” order); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F.
Supp. 2d 437, 439-44 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (providing a thorough analysis under eBay’s fourfactor test in denying injunction request).
165

See Paice, 504 F.3d at 1315 (“[W]here the district court determines that a permanent
injunction is not warranted . . . [it] could step in to assess a reasonable royalty in light of
the ongoing infringement.”).
166

See, e.g., Commonwealth Sci. and Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F.
Supp. 2d 600, 605-06 (E.D. Tex. 2007).

167

17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
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complicated to determine who would keep track of the payments and what
should be done with unclaimed money. 168
[59] Proponents of an escrow account for orphan works believe this
system would reduce uncertainty inherent in the currently proposed
legislative solution, while still allowing absentee owners to sue and
possibly enjoin users of the orphan works. 169 A compulsory license would
alleviate potential litigation and transactional costs, while providing
monetary relief to absentee owners at the same time. The infrastructure
for such a system is already available to the Copyright Office, as the
Copyright Office currently maintains a registry system for notices of
intentions and accepts compulsory license payments for making and
distributing phonorecords of unknown owners. 170
[60] Canada has adopted a similar system, in which the Copyright
Board licenses orphan works on behalf of absentee owners. 171 The benefit
of certainty and the maintenance of payment of reasonable fees for the
absentee owners create a low-transactional cost, high-incentive solution to
the accessibility of the orphan works problem.
d.

Creation of a Private Entity for Licensing of
Non-Orphan Works

[61] Legislative action would not create any private entity for licensing
of non-orphan works, and would not directly cover orphan works. Instead,
market-based aspects of the hybrid solution would help prevent works
from becoming orphaned in the first instance, and would lower transaction
costs for companies who wish to utilize or digitize copyrighted works.
168

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS, supra note 13, at 11.

169

See id. at 114.

170

See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 73: COMPULSORY LICENSE FOR MAKING AND
DISTRIBUTING PHONORECORDS, supra note 147, at 3.
171

See Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, § 77 (Can.).
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The private licensing entity would function similarly to the performance
rights organizations that already exist for the music industry, such as
ASCAP, BMI or SESAC. 172 These performance rights organizations have
bargained with individual copyrights holders for the right to license their
copyrighted work. The performance rights organizations undertake the
task of entering into license agreements for each work and then make
available the right to publicly perform the work in a collective license to
third parties. 173 For example, a convention center is likely to have a
license to publicly perform individual songs through a single license with
a performance rights organization. These collective licenses have enabled
hotels, airports, and radio stations to get a few blanket licenses that would
cover all the songs that they may publicly perform in their space, without
having to engage in individual bargaining with each rights holder. 174
[62] A similar private licensing organization should be set-up for books,
similar to what the BRR would have been under the ASA. Each
individual copyright holder would negotiate and enter into a license with
the licensing organization, and the organization would then grant a
collective license to Google, Microsoft, Yahoo!, or any other user that
might want to scan books covered by the license. As long as revenue
streams continue to flow to copyright holders, the incidence of work
abandonment should fall considerably. This type of organization would
thus slow the orphanage of creative works while simultaneously easing
transaction costs in individual bargaining for large digitization projects.

172

See ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2011); BMI,
http://www.bmi.com (last visited Nov. 18, 2011); SESAC, http://www.sesac.com (last
visited Nov. 18, 2011).

173

See, e.g., Do You Need an ASCAP License, ASCAP, http://www.ascap.com/licensing
(last visited Nov. 18, 2011) (discussing the licensing of music).
174

See, e.g., id.
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Hybrid Solution Analysis

[63] Under the axiomatic approach under Section III, Axiom 1 is
clearly satisfied for the same reasons the ASA satisfies Axiom 1. The
hybrid solution would provide absentee owners the right to claim
reasonable monetary compensation in the event that the absentee owners
resurface. 175 Where the hybrid solution differs from current copyright
law, the compulsory license scheme affords absentee owners payment of
reasonable compensation through an escrow account without incurring the
transaction costs and uncertainty of litigation.
[64] Axiom 2 is also satisfied because accessibility to orphan works
should marginally increase relative to the status quo. The hybrid solution
provides users certainty as to the cost of using an orphan work,
eliminating the need to worry about potential litigation costs, including
potential judgments of monetary and injunctive relief. Reductions in
uncertainty and potential liability under the hybrid solution should create
marginal reductions in the cost of orphan work appropriation, and thus
affect marginal increases in creative work availability. Importantly, the
increased accessibility would include works beyond books, and would not
be limited to Google as the sole provider. Instead, third parties would be
incentivized to enter the book digitization market, potentially expanding
orphan works’ availability beyond what Google could achieve alone.
Thus, the hybrid solution would likely provide more access to orphan
works than under the current copyright system or the ASA solution.
[65] This analysis suggests the hybrid solution would constitute a
Pareto improvement upon the current system. Reasonably compensated
for low to no transaction costs, and with certainty as to the compensation,
absentee owners are almost certainly made no worse off than under the
current policy regime. At the same time, the availability of orphan works
is increased marginally relative to the status quo. Thus, the hybrid
175

As explained supra Part IV.A.2, it is not likely that absentee owners would be able to
claim statutory damages, which would only be available to copyright holders who
registered the copyright within three months of publication but before infringement.
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solution represents what might be called an obvious improvement upon
current copyright law for orphaned works.
[66] Importantly, the hybrid solution also improves upon aspects of
both the legislative and ASA solutions. The hybrid solution improves
upon the current legislative proposal in several ways: (1) it would remove
uncertainties for both users and absentee owners; (2) it would guarantee
payment to absentee owners without litigation upon resurfacing; and (3) it
would decrease transaction costs of reasonably diligent searches. These
improvements would make orphan works more accessible—thus
increasing public welfare—and meet both Axioms proposed under Section
III. The hybrid solution also improves upon the now rejected ASA. First,
the scope of the hybrid solution applies more broadly than the ASA by
covering all orphan works. Second, the hybrid solution would affect
greater competition among appropriations, in turn increasing accessibility
and lowering cost to access the digitized works.
VI.

CONCLUSION

[67] Recent technological innovations have allowed end-users to access
information in larger quantities and at higher speeds than ever before.
Especially in the area of digitized books, technology develops at a rapid
pace, and copyright law has struggled to keep up. The orphan works
problem presents an ugly example of the expanding gap between
technological applications and the flexibility of copyright. This problem
demonstrates the need for change in the current copyright law.
[68] Unfortunately, attempts to address the orphan works problem
through the courts appear unavailing. Google tried to solve this problem
through a market-based contract, but found itself rebuffed on the grounds
that it tried to solve the problem through the wrong venue. 176 A legislative
approach to the orphan works problem appears more promising, but the
current pending legislative proposal seems insufficient. In terms of the
176

See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 670 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (denying
the amended settlement agreement).
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axiomatic approach adopted in this paper, the proposed legislation simply
fails the aforementioned Axiom 1: it does not obviously protect absentee
owners from being made worse off than under the current system.
[69] By combining some of provisions of the pending legislation,
features of the ASA, and the already existing licensing infrastructures and
ideas, the legislative solution proposed by this article demonstrates a
Pareto improvement on the status quo, the proposed legislation, and the
ASA. The proposed hybrid solution would finally bring copyright law on
orphan books to the digital age. The hybrid solution is not perfect, and it
does not solve all problems revolving around orphan works, but compared
to the current copyright system, it is a Pareto improvement.
[70] As a practical matter, any legislative proposal will face obstacles,
because reasonable people disagree on what would be the best solution.
The proposed hybrid solution is sufficiently comprehensive, but leaves
room for change and improvement, as implementation may raise
additional issues. It presents a forward-looking solution for a legal
problem that continues to change with developing technology.
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